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Abstract 
State’s border and boundary have important role to definite state jurisdiction, included maritime 
borders and boundaries. State jurisdiction on the ocean will impact to economic value that 
can be earned by the state and political activity. This article explains what governance can do 
to maximize maritime utilization and maintain marine ecosystem by strengthen international 
cooperation without spoiling national’s jurisdiction among the states. This article suggests that 
a group of States have acknowledged that adequate ecosystem management, particularly in a 
changing climate, requires imaginative thinking about how to work flexibly across delineated 
political boundaries.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Global maritime boundaries are highly contested. States have 
understandably made the extension of maritime jurisdictions a political 
priority becomes the extension of maritime boundaries under the law of 
the sea regime secures legal rights to assert management over both living 
and non-living marine resources. States have long recognized the value 
in nationalizing or at least regionalizing maritime zones. For example, in 
August 1952, the leaders of Chile, Ecuador and Peru on the justification 
of food security and sustainable development entered a “Declaration on 
the Maritime Zone” stating that the maritime zones recognized under 
the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 
were “insufficient to permit the conservation, development and use of 
those [living and nonliving] resources, to which the coastal countries 
Indonesian Journal of International Law (2018), Vol. 15 No. 3, pp. 277 - 305
http://dx.doi.org/10.17304/ijil.vol15.3.728
Copyright © 2018 – Anastasia Telesetsky, Published by Lembaga Pengkajian Hukum Internasional 
Anastasia Telesetsky
278
are entitled.”1 In response, the three States decided among themselves 
that “each of them possesses sole sovereignty and jurisdiction over the 
area of sea adjacent to the coast of its own country and extending not 
less than 200 nautical miles from the said coast.”
With the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, States were directed to cooperate across political boundaries. 
Article 63 requires States sharing stocks across exclusive economic zones 
to “seek, either directly or through appropriate sub regional or regional 
organizations, to agree upon the measures necessary to coordinate and 
ensure the conservation and development” of shared stocks.2 The same 
article requires parties to “seek…to agree” through shared governance 
organizations measures to conserve stocks straddling across a high seas 
and exclusive economic zone boundary. 3 On the high seas States are 
expected to cooperate over the conservation and management of living 
resources by establishing sub regional or regional fishing organizations. 
States have made efforts to coordinate resource management across 
boundaries through Regional Fisheries Management Organizations and 
Regional Seas Programmes. Some of these programs have had greater 
success in creating cooperative frameworks than other programs. A lack 
of political will to achieve even basic conservation outcomes for target 
stocks has undermined the credibility of some organizations such as 
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna.4 Other 
organizations such as Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic 
1  U.S. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence Research, Limits in the Sea: No. 
88 Maritime Boundary: Ecuador-Peru: (October 2, 1979): 4 at https://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/58821.pdf  (Providing English translation of 1952 Tripartite 
Declaration on the Maritime Zone) 
2  UNCLOS Article 63(1)
3  Ibid. Article 63(2)
4  U.S. Senator John Kerry, “Senate Resolution 180- Expressing the Sense of the 
Senate Regarding the Policy of the United States at the 17th Regular Meeting of the 
International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna in Murcia, Spain”, 
Congressional Record (November 13, 2001): 22269 (Commenting that” I am sad to 
report that many ICCAT member nations have failed to comply with basic ICCAT 
quota and minimum size regulations for several important species…Furthermore, it is 
my understanding that some ICCAT member nations have undermined essential con-
servation plans  from the outset for several ICCAT species, by simply setting a quota 
that is in flagrant disregard of the best advice of the scientific community.”)
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Marine Living Species have been more successful in convincing States 
to require ecosystem based fishing practices in the Southern Oceans as 
evidenced by their regulation of the krill industry and fishing bycatch.5 
With increasing pressures on ocean resources arising from warming 
oceans and acidifying seas, continued dysfunction in cooperative 
resource governance will only delay needed transboundary ecological 
management interventions. Quite recently, States have acknowledged 
that the existing ocean governance system is inadequate to address the 
immense external pressures on the system. In response, States agreed 
to Sustainable Development Goal 14 for States to “conserve and 
sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable 
development.”6  
States agreed to pursue ten targets:
Target 14.1: By 2025, prevent and significantly reduce marine 
pollution of all kinds, in particular from land-based activities, including 
marine debris and nutrient pollution.
Target 14.2: By 2020, sustainably manage and protect marine and 
coastal ecosystems to avoid significant adverse impacts, including by 
strengthening their resilience, and take action for their restoration in 
order to achieve healthy and productive oceans.
Target 14.3: Minimize and address the impacts of ocean acidification, 
including through enhanced scientific cooperation at all levels.
Target 14.4: By 2020, effectively regulate harvesting and end 
overfishing, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and destructive 
fishing practices and implement science-based management plans, in 
order to restore fish stocks in the shortest time possible, at least to levels 
that can produce maximum sustainable yield as determined by their 
biological characteristics.”
5   Mary Ruckelshaus et al. “Marine Ecosystem-based Management in Practice: Sci-
entific and Governance Challenges”,  BioScience, 58(1) (1 January 2008): 53–63 
(e.g. CCAMLR uses models of krill productivity to set sustainable harvest targets that 
were decreased by 25% to reflect an amount that scientists estimated predators needed 
for consumption. CCAMLR also sets thresholds for incidental bycatch. Once these 
thresholds have been met, a target fishery will be closed.)
6  United Nations, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Devel-
opment (2015) at p. 20. 
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Target 14.5: By 2020, conserve at least 10 percent of coastal and 
marine areas, consistent with national and international law and based 
on the best available scientific information.
Target 14.6: By 2020, prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies 
which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, eliminate subsidies 
that contribute to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and refrain 
from introducing new such subsidies, recognizing that appropriate and 
effective special and differential treatment for developing and least 
developed countries should be an integral part of the World Trade 
Organisation fisheries subsidies negotiation.
Target 14.7: By 2030, increase the economic benefits to small island 
developing States and least developed countries from the sustainable 
use of marine resources, including through sustainable management of 
fisheries, aquaculture and tourism.
Target 14.a: Increase scientific knowledge, develop research 
capacity and transfer marine technology, taking into account the 
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission Criteria and Guidelines 
on the Transfer of Marine Technology, in order to improve ocean 
health and to enhance the contribution of marine biodiversity to the 
development of development countries, in particular small island 
developing States and least developed countries.
Target 14.b: Provide access for small-scale artisanal fishers to 
marine resources and markets. 
Target 14.c: Enhance the conservation and sustainable use of oceans 
and their resources by implementing international law as reflected in the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which provides the 
legal framework for the conservation and sustainable use of oceans and 
their resources, as recalled in paragraph 158 of “The Future we Want.”7 
While States can seek to achieve these targets through transboundary 
cooperation, it is not obvious from the text of the SDG 14 targets 
that the success of many of these targets will depend on the ability 
of States to integrate actions across national boundaries. There is no 
acknowledgment that politically delineated boundaries can create 
stumbling blocks for achieving SDGs unless States agree to re-imagine 
7  Ibid. at pp. 20-21. 
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the function of boundaries in addressing ecosystem health across 
seascapes. The word “boundary” does not appear in the SDGs and the 
only allusion to spatial boundaries are the references in Target 14.2 
to  “marine and coastal ecosystems” and Target 14.5 to “coastal and 
marine areas.” 
 In June 2017, 178 States and the European Union met in New 
York at the United Nations Conference to Support the Implementation 
of Sustainable Development Goal 14. The States adopted a resolution 
entitled “our ocean, our future: call for action” recognizing “different 
national realities” and a variety of “national policies and priorities.”8 
The resolution urged states to integrate Goal 14 and its targets “into 
national development plans and strategies, to promote national 
ownership” and for strengthened cooperation between and among 
“international organizations, regional and subregional organizations 
and institutions, arrangements and programmes.”9 States were urged 
to enhance engagement “with global, regional and subregional bodies 
and programmes, the scientific community, the private sector, the donor 
community, non-governmental organizations, community groups, 
academic institutions, and other relevant actors.”10  
While it is clear that multi-level cooperation requires working across 
physical boundaries with government and non-government actors in 
multiple States, the Conference documents seem to assume that political 
boundaries are permeable for purposes of achieving SDG 14. Seven 
concept papers were drafted in preparation for the ocean conference 
covering a range of topics related to SDG targets from marine pollution 
to sustainable fisheries. Somewhat surprisingly, the often contentious 
issues of boundaries and the possibility of re-imagining boundaries to 
achieve some of the shared goals was addressed only fleetingly by two 
of the concept papers. The concept paper for the partnership dialogue 
on enhancing conservation and sustainable use of oceans through 
implementation of UNCLOS observed that coastal States are expected 
to clearly define and publicize the limits of their maritime zones 
because “they provide legal certainty with regard to the extent of the 
8  Report of the United Nations Conference to Support the Implementation of Sustain-
able Development Goal 14 A/CONF.230/14 (June 5-9, 2017): paras. 7 and 9
9  Ibid. at para. 13(b)
10  Ibid. at para. 13(c)
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sovereignty or sovereign rights and jurisdiction of coastal States.”11 The 
paper goes on to observe that “overlapping maritime claims exist, which 
can adversely impact…effective management.”12 The concept paper on 
conserving and restoring marine and coastal ecosystems recognized 
that Large Marine Ecosystems “generally transcend legal boundaries 
and encompass the maritime zones of two or more countries, thereby 
fostering international cooperation among countries, but also presenting 
a major governance challenge.”13 
These brief key references to delineating maritime claims and large 
marine ecosystems should be at the centre of any efforts to achieve 
ocean sustainability. This paper argues that greater political investment 
needs to be made in securing institutional arrangements that are 
capable of transcending political boundaries to achieve sustainability 
targets by focusing on maritime boundaries as border regions rather 
than delineations. The following section will explore the juxtaposition 
of boundaries and borders. The third section will describe a number 
of ongoing global efforts to transcend maritime boundaries to achieve 
ecosystem and provide some observations about existing challenges 
associated with these efforts. The final section will ask whether the 
existing approaches offer a model that can be adapted to governance of 
other seascapes.  
II.  BOUNDARIES VS. BORDERS
One explanation for a lukewarm level of cooperation in some ocean 
regions is the continued political pursuit to define boundaries rather 
than borders. The concept of “boundary” versus “border” is more 
than just a semantic difference.  Boundaries are understood as sites of 
stable territorial demarcation. They exist to define sovereign interests 
11  United Nations Ocean Conference, Concept Paper: Partnership dialogue 7: Enhanc-
ing the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Oceans and Their Resources by Imple-
menting International Law as Reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (2017) https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/14402Pa
rtnershipdialogue7.pdf12  Ibid. 
13  United Nations Ocean Conference, Concept Paper: Partnership dialogue 2: Manag-
ing, protecting, conserving and restoring marine and coastal ecosystems (2017)https://
sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/14430Partnershipdialogue2.pdf
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within which States can assert political authority over property. Fixing 
of boundary points is an exercise in “the will of the sovereign.”14 In 
securing State jurisdictional interests, States are increasingly wary of 
creating an administrative record that suggests the possibility of one 
State acquiescing to another State’s interests.15    
Among the first multilateral negotiations involving the law of the sea, 
States focused attention on defining and securing individual maritime 
boundaries and entitlements. These first negotiations were triggered 
by perceived threats of unilateral jurisdictional expansion.  In 1945, 
United States President Harry S Truman announced the extension of 
U.S. jurisdiction over natural resources located on the U.S. continental 
shelf and over the high seas fisheries resources adjacent to the U.S. 
coast in order to secure conservation.16 In 1946, Argentina unilaterally 
asserted interests over its continental shelf and Panama declared in its 
constitution that the continental shelf was part of its national territory.17 
Exhibiting both opportunism and an expansive imagination, Chile, 
Peru, and Ecuador in 1952 asserted interests over a 200 nautical mile 
zone. 18  
14  Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), ICJ Judg-
ment of 3 Feb. 1994, [1994] ICJ Rep 6, at para. 4
15  See e.g. Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Mid-
dle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore), ICJ Judgment of 23 May 2008 
(Finding that Malaysia acquiesced through a series of statements and omissions to 
title being secured for Singapore in the island of Pedra Blanca)
16  Harry S. Truman, Proclamation 2668,  Policy of the United States with respect to 
Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas (28 September 1945);Harry S. 
Truman, Proclamation 2667 Policy of the United States with respect to the Natural 
Resources of the Subsoil and the Sea-Bed of the Continental Shelf (28 September 
1945); Harry S. Truman, Executive Order 9634, Providing for the Establishment of 
Fishery Conservation Zones
17  Argentina, October 9, 1946 Declaration Proclaiming Sovereignty over the Epicon-
tinental Sea and the Continental Shelf, Decree 14708, Boletin Oficial de la Republica 
Argentina  (5 December 1946)(Recognizing “the right of every nation to consider the 
entire extent of the epicontinental sea and the adjacent continental shelf as national 
territory.”; Panama Constitution (1 March 1946): Article 209-4. 
18  Tripartite Agreement, supra note 1. (Proclaiming “as a principle of their interna-
tional maritime policy, that each of them possesses sole sovereignty and jurisdiction 
over the area of sea adjacent to the coast of its own country and extending not less than 
200 nautical miles from the said coast.”
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 In  response to this flurry of jurisdictional expansion,  delegates 
to the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958 
drafted four multilateral conventions that are collectively known as the 
“Geneva Conventions”. While the Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
the Contiguous Zone and the Convention on the Continental Shelf did 
not conclusively define the boundaries, they  emphasized the bounded 
nature of sovereignty. For example, if interests in a jurisdictional zone 
overlap as in the case of continental shelf entitlements, States are 
expected to negotiate boundaries.19  
States were not satisfied with the ambiguity of the Geneva 
Conventions and in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea, States specified the extent of the geographical boundaries for 
a coastal State’s territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic 
zone, and continental shelf. The concept of boundaries continued to 
“harden” as State parties to UNCLOS are expected to deposit with the 
Secretary-General of the U.N. all charts showing straight baselines that 
close the mouths of rivers and bays, 20archipelagic baselines, 21 and 
the outer limits of a State’s territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive 
economic zone, and continental shelf. 22 While a declaration of maritime 
limits and boundaries may contribute to predictable relations among 
States, these limits and boundaries can create barriers for action when 
focusing on conserving and restoring ecological relationships. Political 
boundaries are particularly problematic for managing migrating species 
since migration patterns rarely conform to regional geopolitics. 
A more relevant concept for cooperation to achieve SDG 14 is the 
concept of a border as a space that defines interests but is also open to flux 
and possible changes. While borders can be articulated as boundaries, 
they can also be understood as places across which ideas, goods, people, 
and other species flow.  In terms of marine environmental governance, 
19  Convention on the Continental Shelf (29 April 1958) (In force 10 June 1964), 
U.N.T.S. 7302 vol. 499, pp. 312-321: Article 6 (“Where the same continental shelf is 
adjacent to the territories of two or more States whose coasts are opposite each other, 
the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined 
by agreement between them.”)
20  UNCLOS Article 16 
21  Ibid at Article 47
22  Ibid. at Articles 16, 75, and 84. 
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the concept of permeable borders is far more relevant than that of a 
permanent boundary registered with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. This is because ecological relations exist across borders. An 
ecological map of the global oceans based on large marine ecosystems 
or seascape diverges from a map based on political boundaries. 
Marine scientists and policy scholars have long recognized the 
disconnect between governance at the political boundary level and 
the ecological realities of complex marine ecosystems.23 In the 
1980s, Kenneth Sherman at U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration and Lewis Alexander at the University of Rhode Island 
introduced the concept of a “Large Marine Ecosystem” (LME) as a 
framework for analyzing regional sustainability. 24 The researchers 
identified 64 LMEs composed of both coastal lands and ocean waters 
and proposed evaluating through an interdisciplinary approach each 
ecosystem on the basis of nutrient and primary productivity, fish stock 
populations and biomass, marine and land-based pollution, human 
marine activities, and governance. Key to the concept of an LME is 
the ability for States to cooperate across their boundaries by blurring 
boundaries into borders between States.  
A viable LME cannot be constrained to the jurisdictional boundaries 
provided for under UNCLOS whenever there are species capable of 
traveling long distances or negative consequences for a habitat from 
further fragmentation of habitat (e.g. limited gene pool for future 
restoration efforts). To the extent that the maritime boundaries are 
arbitrarily derived from the formulas available under UNCLOS, there 
is a risk of under-management across the range of a LME. 
23  Lawrence Juda, “Consideration in Developing a Functional Approach to the Gov-
ernance of Large Marine Ecosystems” 30 Ocean Development & International Law 2 
(1999) :93 “[O]ne of the basic problems faced by those who favour ecosystem-based 
management approaches is the lack of congruence between what might be termed 
‘politically defined space,’ that, is the geographic area encompassed by particular hu-
man governance systems, and ‘ecologically defined space’ composed of the area over 
which natural ecosystems extend.” 
24  Kenneth Sherman “Large Marine Ecosystems: Stress, Mitigation, and Sustainabil-
ity” Large Marine Ecosystems: Stress, Mitigation and Sustainability (ed. Kenneth 
Sherman and Lewis Alexander) (AAAS Press, Washington DC, 1993); Kenneth Sher-
man “The large marine ecosystem concept: A research and management strategy for 
living marine resources.” Ecological Applications 1(4) (1991): 349-360
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If Sustainable Development Goal 14 and particularly Targets 14.1, 
14.2, and 14.3 are to be realized by coastal States, States must address 
the existing disconnect between political boundaries and ecological 
borders as reflected in the identification of LMEs. To do this requires 
reconceiving of “scale.” The next section describes a variety of multi-
partner cooperative conservation efforts being undertaken at the 
ecosystem level. In particular, the article will cover (1) unique high-
level collaboration among six Asia-Pacific States that has resulted in the 
creation of the Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI) (2) collaboration in the 
Caribbean Saragasso Sea among a number of States and organizations 
to protect and conserve a unique ecosystem existing largely beyond 
national jurisdiction and (3) the multi-state LME commissions in 
Asia and Africa. On the basis of reviewing academic literature and 
documents produced by the CTI parties,  the Sargasso Sea Commission, 
and the LME Commissions, the article will identify some of the legal 
and institutional challenges of implementing the initiative in the 
regions.  Given both the regional and global pressures particularly on 
living marine resources, the article concludes by questioning whether 
the governance models designed around socio-ecological borders rather 
than political boundaries can be further disseminated into other regions 
that share large marine ecosystems or seascapes. 
III.OCEAN GOVERNANCE MODELS THAT TRANSCEND 
BOUNDARIES  
With centuries of efforts dedicated to delineating ocean boundaries but 
only approximately 40 years of sustained effort in coordinating ecosystem 
management between States, many States have only recently begun to 
invest resources in designing transboundary governance arrangements 
to further ecosystem protection, conservation, and restoration. While 
this article is not intended to be a comprehensive compendium of 
existing and former efforts to design transboundary institutions,25 this 
25  For example, Agulhas and Somali Current LME, Bay of Bengal LME, Canary 
Current LME, Guinea Current LME, Gulf of Mexico LME, Humboldt Currrent LME, 
Abrolhos Seascape (off Bahia, Brazil), Eastern Tropical Pacific Seascape (Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador and Panama), Glover’s Reef Seascape (Belize), Patagonian and 
Southwest Atlantic Seascape, Vatu-i-Ra Seascape (Fiji) 
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article describes three examples of State-based transboundary marine 
governance initiatives and the potential of these initiatives to serve 
as models for other regions who have made commitments to achieve 
the Sustainable Development Goals.  Environmental regimes where 
principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking are centred around a 
limited set of issue have been shown to improve cooperation.26 All of the 
examples discussed below promote “ecosystem-based management” 
understood in this article as management practices promoting:
1) The protection of structures, functions and key processes within a 
specific place-based ecosystem and 
2) The integration of ecological, social, economic and institutional 
needs.
Because the focus on this article is on States reconceiving political 
boundaries in the context of shared ecological borders, the examples 
chosen were selected because they involve multiple States who have 
exhibited a high-level of political will. While outside entities such as 
NGOs, influential individuals, or intergovernmental organizations were 
responsible for initiating the ecosystem based governance efforts and 
continue to be involved with ongoing financing and technical support, 
each of the examples below illustrates long-term regional political 
commitment. The three examples discussed are the Southeast Asian 
Coral Triangle Initiative, the Caribbean Sargasso Sea effort, and the 
Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem. 
A.  THE CORAL TRIANGLE INITIATIVE GOVERNANCE 
MODEL AND BORDERS
The Coral Triangle covers an ocean and coastal of 5.7 million square 
kilometres (approximately half the size of the United States land mass) 
including portions of Indonesia, portions of Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Timor Leste, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands region.27 The 
region takes its name from the fact that 76% of all global coral species 
can be found somewhere in the Coral Triangle. The region is globally 
recognized as a place of great biological and cultural significance due to 
26  Oran Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources 
and the Environment (Cornell University Press, 1989)
27  Pedro Fidelman et al. “Governing Large-Scale Marine Commons: Contextual Chal-
lenges in the Coral Triangle” 36 Marine Policy (2012) at p. 43. 
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its ecological diversity that include 37% of the world’s reef fish species 
and important nurseries for blue whales. 
With approximately 100 million of the 363 million people living 
in the Coral Triangle primarily dependent on coastal resources for 
sustenance, humans have impacted the region’s unique ecosystems 
through overfishing and habitat degradation. The long-term prognosis of 
climate change impacts within the region such as warming oceans, coral 
bleaching, and ocean acidification does not deliver a positive narrative 
for regional sustainability.  Recognising existing and future pressures 
on the regional ocean system, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono proposed an intergovernmental effort among neighboring 
States leading to the creation of the “Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral 
Reefs, Fisheries and Food Security” (CTI). His proposal was for all 
of the States bordering the biodiverse region to harmonize marine 
management objectives and coordinate mechanisms for achieving the 
objectives. 
The Coral Triangle has not been defined as a separate LME but 
includes regions designated by Sherman and Alexander as parts of 
the Indonesian Sea and the Sulu-Celebes Sea. Applying a bioregional 
framework to area, Green and Mous mapped the shared sea space 
and identified 11 ecoregions and 32 functional seascapes within the 
ecoregions.28 While “LME” as a term of reference has not been selected 
by the CTI parties, States are committed to implementing a variation of 
an LME governance framework that changes boundaries into borders. 
The term “seascape” within the CTI refers to “large, multiple-use marine 
areas defined scientifically and strategically, in which government 
authorities, private organizations and other stakeholders cooperate to 
conserve the diversity and abundance of marine life and to promote 
28  A.l. Green and P.J. Mous Delineating the Coral Triangle, its Ecoregions and Func-
tional Seascapes v. 5. The Nature Conservancy Coral Triangle Program Report 1/08 
(2008); The term “seascape” has been used by the NGOs World Wide Fund for Na-
ture and Wildlife Conservation Society for over 15 years as a biogeographic term. 
Conservation International (CI) expanded the concept of a “seascape” when it began 
its two large projects in the Coral Triangle region before the Coral Triangle Initiative 
was launched as an regional initiative by the President of indonesia. As used by CI, 
a functional “seascape”  depends on good governance at local, national and regional 
level to deliver ecosystem and sustainability benefits. 
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human well-being.”29 
In 2009, the parties agreed at a Summit in Manado, Sulawesi in 
Indonesia to a non-binding agreement to develop “seascapes” for 
sustainable management by 2020, apply ecosystem based management 
to fisheries and other marine resources in the region, establish region-
wide MPAs, cooperate to improve the status of threatened species, 
and introduce a “region-wide early action plan” for climate change 
adaptation to be implemented by 2015. 30 This Regional Plan of Action 
is intended to influence national decision-making. 
What makes the CTI initiative unique as a governance model is 
the effort by leaders at the highest levels of government to work with 
ecological experts to redesign the regional map to create a space of 
common concern for the participating States. In spite of some boundary 
issues between parties, the States agreed to focus on blurring political 
boundaries for purposes of achieving the objectives of the CTI and 
instead redefining their cooperation on the basis of bio-geographical 
borders. If conservation and restoration are to be effective at the 
ecosystem level, States in the region understand that they must cooperate 
across their political boundaries since the maps of the ecoregions and 
functional seascapes within the Coral Triangle do not conform to either 
existing political boundaries or desired political boundaries. To the 
extent that States accept the validity of the ecoregions and acknowledge 
ecological overlaps across the borders of the Philippines and Indonesia, 
Timor and Indonesia, and Malaysia and Indonesia, States participating 
in the Coral Triangle Initiative have shown a willingness to re-imagine 
resource management in spatial delimitations that are very different 
from UNCLOS’ conventional jurisdictional zones that reify sovereign 
rights of use at the expense of ecological cooperation.
For example, the States have developed a common understanding 
for a  Coral Triangle Marine Protected Area System that connects the 
six States across ecological borders. The States are in the process of 
developing a CTI Regional Framework that establishes joint goals, 
objectives, and operational designs across a network of MPAs. In 
addition, the States have acknowledged the need for a common regional 
29  Ibid. at 2
30  Coral Triangle Initiative Secretariat, Regional Plan of Action (2009)
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framework based on implementing an ecosystem approach to the 
management of fisheries resources.31 
The level of political will involved with building collaboration 
within the CTI is high with regular meetings among a Council of 
Ministers and Senior Officials.  With the support of intergovernmental 
funding (Global Environmental Facility) and large NGOs such as World 
Wide Fund for Nature, The Nature Conservancy, and Conservation 
International, the CTI has maintained institutional momentum through 
the creation of a permanent secretariat that not only supports the efforts 
of the governments but facilitates private sector involvement in the 
government initiative.  The Secretariat has its own legal personality 
separate from the States and operates independently. It serves as 
a regional coordinator hosting a number of on-line collaborative 
workspaces for both Senior Officials and Local Government Mayors 
from municipalities in the various States designed to build a virtual 
community.  
B. SARGASSO SEA COMMISSION 
The Sargasso Sea is an almost 2 million square mile sea region 
that includes region beyond national jurisdiction. It is a place rich in 
biodiversity with significant populations of  tuna, billfish, eels, sharks, 
whales, sea turtles, and rare invertebrate species.  The region is named 
after the presence of beds of sargassum, a type of seaweed critical 
for the ecosystem. The region faces a number of threats including oil 
pollution, overfishing, plastic pollution, and the introduction of exotic 
species that compete with endemic species. 
In 2010 with support from States, intergovernmental organizations, 
and NGOs, the Sargasso Sea Project was created to raise awareness of the 
threats to the Sargasso Sea.  In 2014, under the leadership of Bermuda, 
a number of States with territory bordering the region concluded The 
31  Putrajaya Joint Ministerial Statement, 4th Meeting of the CTI-CFF Council of Min-
isters (26 November 2012) CTI Initiative  (Supporting “an Ecosystem Approach to 
Fisheries Management in Coral Triangle Initiative) (http://www.coraltriangleinitiative.
org/sites/default/files/resources/SOM%208%20and%20MM%204%20FINAL%20
PUTRAJAYA%20JOINT%20MINISTERIAL%20STATEMENT%281%29.pdf; 8th 
CTI_CFF Senior Officials Meeting (22-24 November 2012) (“Acknowledging the 
need for common regional framework to manage fisheries resources”)
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Hamilton Declaration on Collaboration for the Conservation of the 
Sargasso Sea.32 Other States have indicated support for the Sargasso 
Sea project. 33 Under the Declaration the States agreed to have meetings 
as necessary and to rely on a permanently constituted Sargasso Sea 
Secretariat to work closely with the Sargasso Sea Commission to 
exercise a stewardship role over the Sargasso Sea. In 2015, the Saragasso 
Sea was the only named ecosystem in the United Nations Global 
Reporting and Assessment of the State of the Marine Environment 
report. Representatives from the Sargasso Sea Project have worked 
closely with existing intergovernmental organizations such as the North 
Atlantic Fisheries Organization to systematically address threats to the 
ecosystem by for-example regulating trawling activities and prohibiting 
fishing on seamounts. The project has also worked with numerous 
other bodies including inter alia the International Commission for 
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, the Caribbean Regional Sea programs, 
and  the International Maritime Organization. 
The States agreed to develop a joint work program that includes 
recognizing the ecological importance of the Sargasso Sea, developing 
joint fisheries habitat conservation programs, identifying impacts from 
international shipping and other marine activities, and conserving 
migratory species.  
C  BENGUELA CURRENT BENGUELA CURRENT LARGE 
MARINE ECOSYSTEM  PROJECT
Located in one of the most productive upwelling zones in the world, 
the Benguela Current LME (BCLME) is a biologically diverse shared 
ocean space that connects the Exclusive Economic Zones of Angola, 
Namibia, and South Africa. The region is facing a number of threats 
including lower fishing yields, deterioration in water quality, destruction 
of both coastal and seabed habitat, and harmful algal blooms. 
The BCLME conservation, restoration, and sustainable use  program 
has been supported at the highest political levels in the three countries 
32  Bermuda, Monaco,  the United Kingdom and the United States are also signatories 
to the declaration.  
33  Dominican Republic, Netherlands, Sweden, South Africa, and Trinidad and Tobago 
have indicated support for the Commission.
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leading to the 2013 adoption of the binding Benguela Current Convention 
in which the three States recognized their “joint responsibility as 
custodians” of the BCLME.34  In the treaty, the States agreed  that the 
terms of the Convention will apply to “all areas within the national 
sovereignty and jurisdiction in accordance” with UNCLOS” bounded 
by the high-water mark along the coasts of the Parties.”35 
The BCLME and the Convention grew out of a previous engagement 
by the three States in a program called “Benguela Environment Fisheries 
Interaction and Training Program”  (BENEFIT) that was financed by 
the Norwegian and German government through their development aid 
agencies. 
Structurally, the BCLME depends on government commitment for 
its existence. On typically an annual basis,36 Ministers from each of the 
countries attend a Ministerial Conference with a national delegation. 
In 2007, the ministers agreed to create the first global  LME-based 
institution, the Benguela Current Commission,  to facilitate State 
cooperation and cooperation with private actors around restoring 
commercial fish stocks in the region.37 Based in Swakopmund, Namibia, 
the Commission works closely with the BCLME Management Board 
consisting of representatives from a number of ministries in each of the 
State.38 
The management board is somewhat unique in its wider participation 
from not just environmental ministries but also commercial industries. 
Presently Angola sends representatives from its Fisheries Institute, 
Petroleum Ministry, and the Ministry of Urbanism & Environment. 
Namibia sends representatives from the Ministry of Mines & 
34  The Benguela Current Convention (2013)  at www.benguelaacc.org/index.php/en/
component/docman/doc_download/695-signed-benguela-current-convention-english
35  Ibid. at Article 3. 
36  Ibid. at Article 6 (Providing that a Conference shall be convened at least every two 
years)
37  Interim Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Angola, Govern-
ment of the Republic of Namibia, and the Government of the Republic of South Africa 
on the Establishment of the Benguela Current Commission(January 2007)
38  The  Benguela Current Commission also works with intergovernmental programmes 
such as the Regional Seas Programme for the West and Central Africa Region, civil 
society groups, private sector, and academia. 
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Energy, the Ministry of Fisheries & Marine Resources, the Ministry 
of Environment & Tourism, and the Ministry of Works & Transport. 
Finally, South Africa’s delegation includes individuals from Department 
of Environmental Affairs; Department of Agriculture, Forestry & 
Fisheries; Petroleum Agency, and Department of Mineral Resources. 
The composition of the Benguela Current Commission brings together 
multiple department who may have conflicting agency agendas. To 
avoid certain types of conflicts, the Board has negotiated a Rules of 
Procedure guide. 
In addition to the Management Board and the Secretariat, the 
BCLME has an Ecosystem Advisory Committee  and a Permanent 
Compliance Committee.39 Under the Ecosystem Advisory Committee, 
scientists and managers from each of the three countries cooperate 
in Joint Working groups.  The Permanent Compliance Committee is 
expected to coordinate compliance activities across the three States.  
The States have agreed to work towards developing and 
implementing a joint programme of work  based on the “Strategic 
Action Plan” for developing scientific advice, implementing training 
and capacity building, sustainably exploiting and managing living and 
non-living marine resources, conserving biodiversity, and preventing 
acute and chronic pollution.  States have agreed to work cooperatively 
to  minimize the impacts of marine diamond mining, oil production, and 
gas production. They have also agreed to work to harmonize regional 
mariculture policies to avoid harmful algal blooms.40
To ensure the involvement of each State in the process of nationally 
implementing the Strategic Action Plan, each State has an “Activity 
Centre” that is funded by both donors and the participating governments. 
The three Centres are expected to coordinate with each other and to 
facilitate the “Advisory Groups”, consisting of 2 individuals from each 
country,  in providing technical support within the region.  Through 
the BCLME program, over 100 projects including a number of 
transboundary projects (e.g. analyzing and mitigating impact of offshore 
diamond mining of other marine resources)  have been implemented by 
39  Benguela Current Convention at Article 10 and Article 12. 




government agencies, universities, private groups, and BENEFIT.  
The BCLME program has used its resources to understand the 
strengths and weaknesses of each State in terms of national and 
local policies to facilitate both ecosystem based management and 
socio-economic development.  In 2009, an outside consultant report 
suggested that far more was known in each of the States about biological 
management indicator than social, economic, or governance indicators. 
The BCLME program has strengthened its transboundary governance 
through the formation of the intergovernmental Commission and the 
tripartite treaty. Notably, the BCLME program inspired the Guinea 
Current LME  to initiate a process for developing  an inter-governmental 
commission to facilitate efforts across the member States. 
III.CHALLENGES INHERENT IN LME GOVERNANCE 
EFFORTS 
The value in creating and governing at the level of an LME or a 
seascape is the deployment of limited state resources to negotiate across 
socio-ecological borders for the good of all participants and not simply 
to reinforce boundaries.41 Each of the examples of LME governance 
described above are testaments to high-level political cooperation. 
Managing an LME over the long-term requires institutional sustainability 
based on continued good relations among State and other partners. The 
remainder of this section focuses on six challenges that are inherent 
in any LME governance effort and describes what the LME programs 
described above are trying to do to address basic governance problems. 
1) Sustaining political will
The first challenge for any LME-type institution or framework is 
sustaining political will. After an initial wave of excitement for a new 
project, it is not uncommon for political will to fade as the complexities 
of implementation manifest in political disagreements between 
constituents. Political figures may find themselves at the crosshairs of 
41  This article recognizes that while there are some differences between an LME, a 
seascape as defined by Conservation International, and an ecoregion, all of these con-
cepts promote large scale conservation and sustainable use practices. For purposes of 
the remainder of this article, these concepts may be used interchangeably. 
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controversy when certain environmental objectives such as conserving 
species or habitat clash with socio-economic objectives such as 
increasing coastal development to build a tourist economy or reducing 
fishing effort. 
The CTI program has continued high levels of political engagement 
across the region. This political will can be explained in part by 
frequent meetings between ministers and between senior officials that 
contribute good working relationships between individuals on behalf of 
their States.  In some instances, the existence of the CTI program has 
encouraged more robust participation from State members. At the State 
responsible for founding the CTI, Indonesia has continued to invest in 
the initiative. Tagged as the second largest plastic polluter in the world, 
Indonesia made a public announcement in March 2017 that it would 
invest up to $1 billion a year to reduce plastic in its waters that are 
contributing to water quality issues for the Coral Triangle.42 
The BCLME program has likewise relied on high-level meetings 
to create a high-level of political engagement by each of the States. 
At the last Benguela Current Commission Ministerial Conference in 
December 2016, nine ministers from each of the three States  discussed 
opportunities to collaborate on a number of joint issues including pooling 
of research vessels for the potential co-management of resources, 
combatting illegal fishing, conducting studies on phosphate mining 
on the seabed floor, and cooperating to develop oil spill contingency 
planning for the region including a regional oil spill response center.43 
2) Sustaining long-term stakeholder interest
Stakeholders are parties that may not “own” a project but instead 
influence the success of a project by transferring skills, knowledge, 
information, finances, or personal connections. In all of the above 
projects, the “owners’ of the projects are the sovereign States that 
are willing to temporarily relax the rigidness of territorial boundaries 
for purposes of achieving the common objectives of large-scale 
conservation and sustainable development planning. The stakeholders 
42  J. Langenheim, ‘Indonesia Pledges $1bn a year to Curb Ocean Waste’, The Guard-
ian (2 March 2017) (Pledging to reduce its marine waste by 70% by 2025)
43  Communique of the 5th Benguela Current Convention Ministerial Conference 
Meeting, Swakopmund, Namibia (8 December 2016) 
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facilitate the achievement of project objectives. 
In the case of the CTI, the stakeholders include both States (United 
States and Australia), intergovernmental entities (Asian Development 
Bank and Global Environmental Facility), and NGOs (World Wide Fund 
for Nature, Conservation International, and The Nature Conservancy).  
In each of these cases,  the stakeholders are not only essential for 
the financial and sometime technical feasibility of the CTI but they also 
contribute to the perception of  credibility for the various project by 
attaching their logos to various CTI .  Taken together, the three examples 
seem to suggest that the success of LME governance, in regions where 
there are funding needs, will depend on what types of partners are 
willing to invest in an LME and what types of expenses they might 
cover that would otherwise go unfunded. For example, while a State 
government can politically justify using its limited funding for anti-
poverty efforts, that State may depend on NGOs or third-party States 
to cover any additional expenses whose primary purpose is to protect 
marine resources. 
Sustaining stakeholder interest for a given project, particularly a 
project that has not yet demonstrated its value, may become increasingly 
challenging when funders and donors have an array of global marine 
governance project to choose among for funding purposes. Increasing 
the number of regional MPAs brings conservation benefits to those 
regions but may also lead in the long-term to thinner coverage of 
budgets for projects as more States compete for limited resources. At the 
outset of programs such as the examples discussed above, States should 
negotiate with potential non-State partners for long-term financing 
that might include bonuses for achieving certain targets ahead of any 
timelines.    Depending on the stakeholder, there may be reluctance to 
guarantee funding beyond an initial period. While funders may want 
to maintain flexibility, their desire may compromise the ability of 
programs to achieve long-term goals such as ecological restoration. 
3) Technical Coordination across boundaries within the LME project
To the extent that there is a broad political support for an ecosystem 
based management approach across a region, there remain practical 
challenges of coordinating technical expertise across different groups. 
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States within a region may have very different capacities to achieve 
agreed upon work plans. Depending on whether a State follows a 
federalist model, certain parts of a State may also be better positioned to 
engage in ecosystem protection and community development than other 
parts of the State leading to different balances of power. Coordination 
problems may also arise due to the existence of different institutional 
cultures within agencies responsible for technical implementation of 
joint work plans. 
These issues have arisen in the case of the projects described above. 
In reviewing its progress in achieving ecosystem protection goals, the 
Sargasso Sea Project has observed that intersectoral communication 
between bodies such as the IMO and regional fisheries bodies can be 
quite weak. The BCLME project has attempted to address some of these 
challenges through its introduction of Activity Centres within each of 
the member states designed to share information and expertise. 
4) Inability to Address Problems Arising Outside of the Project Area
For any large marine ecosystem project, there will be a recurring 
challenge of addressing impacts on the shared ecosystems arise from 
drivers outside of the boundaries of the project. For all of the project, 
climate impacts such as ocean acidification have the potential to 
undermine the joint work effort of States. CTI and Sargasso Sea. 
The existing governance structures cannot manage causes of 
degradation that are largely external to the region. States could decide 
that they wish to put diplomatic pressure on States that are impacting 
their efforts and raise issues of State responsibility. 
No amount of internal political will can eliminate the externalities 
being created by States who are not parties to these initiatives. However, 
States within an initiative can still use their cooperative frameworks for 
further regional goals such as climate mitigation and adaptation. In each 
of the initiatives described above, all of the States involve contribute 
some amount to climate change. In some cases, the contributions are 
de minimis while in other cases such as the Sargasso Sea project and 
Coral Triangle Initiative, contributions by participants such as the 
United States and Indonesia are sizable.  Existing cooperation under 
the initiatives and the good will generated by the initiative might offer 
Anastasia Telesetsky
298
additional motivation for certain parties to invest further in reducing not 
just their regional footprint but also their global environmental impact. 
5) Negotiating the needs of ecosystems with demands of human 
communities 
The need to achieve short-term social and economic benefits for 
communities can conflict with long-term environmental considerations. 
For each of the projects, there are numerous coastal communities 
within the region that depend on the various marine resources that are 
being managed jointly or being proposed for joint management for 
subsistence. In theory, a full implementation of the work projects for 
any of these programs should result in better conditions for stabilizing 
natural resources for community use. To achieve the work plans 
especially plans based on restoration, however, requires a change in 
coastal activities over an extended time frame. For communities that are 
already vulnerable to food security challenges, conflicts may emerge in 
areas where, for example, there are proposals for protected areas that 
threaten available food resources. 
States involved in LME projects must communicate openly with 
communities about what ecosystem based management projects 
entail and how the States intend to address fundamental needs such 
as food security. States cannot expect sacrifices from communities 
that are already socially and economically marginalized for the sake 
of improving the global reputation of a State as an “environmental 
champion.” Providing for both the needs of ecosystems and the demands 
of human communities without creating a situation of “winners and 
losers” requires extensive and ongoing negotiations.  These negotiations 
will involve transaction costs. 
6) Investment in conservation may not be enough and there will be an 
increasing need for investment in ecological restoration. 
In each of the LME based projects described above, conservation 
of marine resources particularly living marine resources such as shared 
fisheries is a priority project objective.  Conservation measures, however, 
may not be sufficient in places where ecosystems are at ecological 
tipping points. As pressures on ocean ecosystems multiply, States will 
need to give more attention to investing in ecological restoration of 
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habitats, especially habitats that generate ecosystem services for coastal 
communities.  
For example, in the Coral Triangle, almost 70% of citizen’s protein 
intake is from fish that exist in coral reef ecosystems. The President 
of the Global Coral Reef Alliance has observed that conservation and 
continued study of the reefs will not address the CTI’s long-term needs. 
He has instead called for investment in new restoration techniques such 
as artificial reefs that are capable of surviving the double threats of global 
warming and pollution. As he observed at a coral reef management 
symposium, “ Restoring the world’s richest and most productive reefs 
on a large scale should be the very central focus for planning the 
sustainable development of the world’s largest island nations.”44
When States embark on a LME program, it is increasingly 
important to consider the human resource, financial, and development 
implications of restoration.  Global environmental politics including 
SDG Target 14.5 have called for increasing conservation of coastal and 
marine areas. This has been understood as delineating protected areas. 
While there is no inherent conflict in undertaking ecological restoration 
within an area designating as protected,45 there have not been many 
sufficient international investments made at the LME level to prepare 
and support communities to undertake restoration projects that will 
provide community with long-term benefits.46
7) Need for full regional participation by States
When political boundaries diverge from “ecological borders”, States 
44  Thomas Goreau, Coral Reef and Fisheries Habitat Restoration in the Coral Triangle: 
The Key to Sustainable Reef Management, Proceedings of Coral Reef Management 
Symposium on Coral Triangle Area (2010): 251 available at http://www.globalcoral.
org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Coral-Reef-and-Fisheries-Habitat-Restoration-in-
the-Coral-Triangle.pdf 
45  For example IUCN understands MPAs as areas designated to “provide for the pro-
tection, restoration, wise use, understanding and enjoyment of the marine heritage of 
the world in perpetuity” IUCN General Assembly Resolution 19.46 (1994)
46  There are significant initiatives that are involved closely with communities such 
as the Coral Reef Targeted Research & Capacity Building for Management and the 
Capturing Coral Reef and Related Ecosystem Services (CCRES) (http://ccres.net/). 
Yet these programs are limited in their reach. For example, the CCRES is limited due 
to resources and program capacity to working within the Philippines and Indonesia. 
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need to cooperate if resources are to be adequately and holistically 
managed. This requires “deep cooperation” requiring investments of 
financial and human resources and not just surface cooperation. Because 
of the transboundary nature of many of the ocean habitats split by 
arbitrary boundaries, States that deliver only surface cooperation might 
become free-riders on the investments by other States. If too many 
States within a region free-ride in spite of contrary political statements, 
then the non-participation of just a few States can undercut the efforts 
of the other States.  
8)  Regional participation has to be translated into national, sub-
national, and local initiatives. 
The success of a LME project will depend on the ability to take a 
large-scale concept and to identify how it can be implemented across 
an array of governance actors including local communities who may 
be politically detached from their central government or in very remote 
locations.  Two of the programs described above have incorporated 
recognition of the principle of subsidiarity. The CTI has a collaboration 
tool for mayors to work across the Coral Triangle. The Benguela LME 
program works through its Activity Centres to identify local initiatives 
for funding that will further the objectives of the States across the LME. 
9)  Actors at a national or sub-national level need to ensure that 
international economic drivers do not undermine national, sub-
national, or local initiatives
States have complex governance models for natural resources. 
Assuming that communities have the resources to invest in ecosystem 
restoration and make these investments, States or sub-national 
governments need to protect community efforts. This may prove 
challenging as States face a conflict of interest between potential 
State revenues and community needs. For at least some States, 
revenues from foreign fishing fleets comprise a substantial amount 
of a government budget. States may need to forego these revenues 
and identify alternative sources of government revenues in order to 
protect community investments. This can lead to interpersonal conflicts 
between government ministries and their long-term objectives for 
economic growth versus social development. In potentially restraining 
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international access to resources, State officials may find themselves 
under a great deal of diplomatic pressure. 
IV. MODELS FOR ADOPTION FOR OTHER SEASCAPES?
A number of States are investing in transboundary LME projects. 
The question arises whether the models described above should 
be replicated in other regions of the world where States are yet not 
engaging in “deep cooperation” across political boundaries but would 
benefit from applying a harmonized ecosystem approach to the region. 
In theory, regional seas organizations and regional fisheries bodies 
exist to cooperate across boundaries. Yet, in many cases, States have 
been wary about investing both financial and political capital into the 
long-term success of these programmes. Created in 1974, the Regional 
Seas Programmes were introduced to provide a common space for 
addressing marine pollution control and management of marine and 
coastal resources. The evaluation of outcomes related to regional 
improvements of environmental quality has been difficult to measure. 
While some of the programmes such as those based in the Mediterranean 
Sea and Antarctica have delivered more tangible cooperation among the 
States parties,  a few programs in other regions have lacked momentum 
with States only providing minimal financing and inconsistent political 
support.47   
The models described above have received political support not 
just by states located within the region but also from other States. For 
example, in July 2007, the Leaders Declaration at the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation meeting expressed support for the Coral 
Triangle initiative. In December 2007, the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations with the endorsement from China, Japan, and Korea 
further confirmed the value of the CTI as a governance initiative. 
Is there potential for State-led, NGO-supported LME projects in 
other biodiverse regions including the East China Sea, the South China 
47  M.A. Jacobson, ‘The United Nations’ Regional Seas Programme: How Does it 
Measure Up?’, Coastal Management, 23(1) (1995) : 19-39; Charles N. Ehler, ‘A 




Sea and the Arctic. In all of these regions, States have identified ongoing 
conflicts over boundaries. In the East and South China Sea regions, 
China, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei disagree 
over both territorial and maritime boundaries. These disagreements 
have led to military confrontations and poor decisions regarding long-
term environmental protection.  48 In the Arctic, States disagree over the 
extent of extended continental shelves and the reach of jurisdiction.49
Recognising that the States that are involved with each of the models 
described above have generally stable political relations, there is some 
question as to whether a similar arrangement could emerge where 
participating States might have fundamental political disagreements. 
The success of any such initiative would depend on the most political 
powerful States taking leadership of any joint effort. In the case of the 
South China Sea, Chinese leadership would be essential  as a driver 
for any shared ecological initiative. Likewise, in the Arctic, Russian 
or Canadian leadership would be required for any initiative to have 
sufficient political to succeed. Such leadership depends on whether 
political leaders identify investments in ecosystem management and 
sustainable development as part of their historic legacy.  
Likewise, even though political leaders receive most of the publicity 
attention associated with these initiatives, the success of initiatives 
will also depend, at least initially, on NGO or intergovernmental 
investments to demonstrate the value of the projects. For each of the 
models described above, early financial investments and investments 
in capacity building laid the foundation for the emergence of the Coral 
Triangle Initiative Secretariat, the Sargasso Sea Commission and the 
Benguela Current Commission, 
 V. CONCLUSION
This article suggests that a group of States have acknowledged 
that adequate ecosystem management, particularly in a changing 
48  In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration, The Republic of the Philippines 
and The People’s Republic of China, PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award. 
49  ‘Frozen Conflict’, The Economist (7 December 2014) https://www.economist.com/
news/international/21636756-denmark-claims-north-pole-frozen-conflict 
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climate, requires imaginative thinking about how to work flexibly 
across delineated political boundaries. These States are trying 
through the development of innovative governance institutions to do 
something constructive even though they face a variety of challenges in 
reconceiving boundaries into borders. 
From a public international law perspective, the models of 
cooperation discussed previously are interesting since they indicate an 
active effort on the part of States to maintain control over activities within 
their boundaries and address certain types of transboundary harms. 
With a focus on managing large marine ecosystems for sustainability 
and ecosystem protection, the governance models advance a different 
biogeographical map than a map based exclusively on geopolitical 
boundaries.  Importantly, States in each the three models are using 
their political capital to secure success by maintaining engagements in 
these initiatives at Ministerial levels. These are not simply projects for 
technocrats but are increasingly becoming part of the identity of the 
States within the region.  
There have been numerous calls for networks of marine protected 
areas capable of linking across ocean ecosystems to include both 
national waters and the high seas.50  The success of these endeavour 
will depend on the ability of States that are committed to the MPAs to 
create appropriate governance mechanisms that take into consideration 
socio-economic needs and the necessity for ecological restoration. In 
all of the examples above, the States have agreed to set aside certain 
political differences with each other in order to build a different kind 
of ecological  “commons” where States will strive to improve national 
performance in order to meet joint objectives.  While it is easy to 
imagine that an acute political crisis could dissolve the goodwill that 
has been built through these existing initiatives, each of the LME 
models described above offers hope for shaping potential future LME 
efforts in areas divided by conflict. Long-term success will depend on 
States observing desirable socio-ecological outcomes and on political 
engagement at all levels including local communities who interact with 
50  B.C. O’Leary et al., ‘The first network of marine protected areas (MPAs) in the 




resources.   
Distinguishing between boundaries and borders is essential for 
governance of LMEs. Because political boundaries rarely coincide 
with ecologically connected habitats, new models of governance are 
becoming increasingly important. 
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